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Abstract
Resampling is an important signature of manipulated
images. In this paper, we propose two methods to detect and
localize image manipulations based on a combination of re-
sampling features and deep learning. In the first method,
the Radon transform of resampling features are computed
on overlapping image patches. Deep learning classifiers
and a Gaussian conditional random field model are then
used to create a heatmap. Tampered regions are located
using a Random Walker segmentation method. In the sec-
ond method, resampling features computed on overlapping
image patches are passed through a Long short-term mem-
ory (LSTM) based network for classification and localiza-
tion. We compare the performance of detection/localization
of both these methods. Our experimental results show that
both techniques are effective in detecting and localizing dig-
ital image forgeries.
1. Introduction
The number of digital images has grown exponentially
with the advent of new cameras, smartphones and tablets.
Social media such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter have
further contributed to their distribution. Similarly, tools for
digitally manipulating these images have evolved signifi-
cantly, and software such as Photoshop, Gimp and smart-
phone apps such as Snapseed, Pixlr make it very trivial
for users to easily manipulate images. Several methods
have been proposed to detect digital image manipulations
based on artifacts from resampling, color filter array, light-
ing, camera forensics, JPEG compression, and many more.
In this paper, we consider artifacts that arise due to re-
sampling which is common when creating digital manip-
ulations such as scaling, rotation or splicing. We propose
two methods to detect and segment image forgeries. In the
first method, we present an end-to-end system to detect and
localize these digital manipulations based on Radon trans-
form and Deep Learning. In the second, we use a combina-
tion of resampling features based on probability-maps (p-
maps) and Long short-term memory (LSTM) based model-
ing to classify tampered patches.
Figure 1: Illustration of our system to detect and localize
digital manipulations. The manipulated image on the left is
processed through a bank of resampling detectors to create
a heat-map (middle), which is then used by a classifier to
detect/localize the modified regions (right)
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we detail some of the related work in the field of
Digital Image Forensics. In Section 3, we describe our end-
to-end system to detect and localize manipulations. Sec-
tion 4 details the experimental results while the conclusion
and future work is presented in Section 5.
2. Related Work
The field of image forensics comprises diverse areas to
detect a manipulated image which includes resampling de-
tection, detection of copy-move, splicing and object re-
moval, JPEG artifacts, machine learning and deep learning
techniques. We will briefly discuss some of them below.
In the past decade several techniques have been pro-
posed to detect resampling in digital images [33, 34, 16,
28, 19, 15, 37]. In most cases, it is assumed to be done
using linear or cubic interpolation. In [33], the authors
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Figure 2: An end-to-end framework to detect and localize digital manipulations.
discuss how resampling introduces specific statistical cor-
relations and show that they can be automatically detected
using an Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. The
algorithm estimates the periodic correlations (after first de-
tecting whether such a correlation exists) among the inter-
polated pixels - the specific type of the correlation indi-
cates the exact form of the resampling. However, the EM-
based method is very susceptible to JPEG attacks - espe-
cially when the JPEG quality factor (QF) is 95 or lower.
The reason is that the periodic JPEG blocking artifacts in-
terfere with the periodic patterns introduced by resampling.
For images that are scaled using linear/cubic interpolation,
an algorithm was proposed by analyzing the variance of the
second difference of interpolated signals [16]. Although
this method can detect only up-scaling, it is very robust
against JPEG compression and detection is possible even
at very low QFs. (Downscaled images can be detected up
to a certain extent but not as robustly as upscaled images.)
This method was further improved to tackle other forms
of resampling using a Radon transform and derivative fil-
ter based approach [28]. In this paper, we utilize the Radon
transform based method and build a feature to detect manip-
ulated regions (see Sec. 3.1). In [19], the author showed a
simpler method to improve [33] by using a linear predictor
residue instead of the computationally expensive EM algo-
rithm. We combine this method with deep learning based
models to detect tampered blocks (see Sec. 3.3). In [37],
the authors exploit periodic properties of interpolation by
the second-derivative of the transformed image for detect-
ing image manipulation. To detect resampling on JPEG
compressed images, the authors added noise before pass-
ing the image through the resampling detector and showed
that adding noise aids in detecting resampling [31, 30].
In [14, 15], a feature is derived from the normalized energy
density and then SVM is used to robustly detect resampled
images. Some recent approaches [17, 21] have been pro-
posed to reduce the JPEG artifact left by compression.
Many methods have been proposed to detect copy-
move [22, 11], splicing [18, 29], seam carving [38, 25]
and inpainting based object removal [41, 23]. Several ap-
proaches exploit JPEG blocking artifacts to detect tampered
regions [13, 24, 27, 9]. In computer vision, deep learning
shows outstanding performance in different visual recog-
nition tasks such as image classification [44], and seman-
tic segmentation [26]. In [26], two fully convolution layers
have been exploited to segment different objects in an im-
age. The segmentation task has been further improved in
[43, 3]. These models extract hierarchical features to rep-
resent the visual concept, which is useful in object segmen-
tation. Since, the manipulation does not exhibit any visual
change with respect to genuine images, these models do not
perform well in segmenting manipulated regions.
Recent efforts in detecting manipulations exploit deep
learning based model in [6, 4, 36]. These include detec-
tion of generic manipulations [6, 4], resampling [5], splic-
ing [36] and bootleg [10]. The authors tested existing CNN
network for steganalysis [35]. In [35], the authors propose
Gaussian-Neuron CNN (GNCNN) for steganalysis. A deep
learning approach to identify facial retouching was pro-
posed in [8]. In [42], image region forgery detection has
been performed using stacked auto-encoder model. In[6], a
new form convolutional layer is proposed to learn the ma-
nipulated features from an image. Unlike most of the deep
learning based image tampering detection methods which
use convolution layers, we present an unique network ex-
ploiting convolution layers along with LSTM network.
3. Detection and Localization
In this section, we describe our end-to-end system to de-
tect and localize manipulations in digital images. Fig. 2
shows the block schematic of our system. The various steps
in framework are as follows: We start by extracting small,
overlapping patches. As the first step in the processing
pipeline, we compute features on each patch. These are
used to characterize any resampling applied to the patch.
This produces a multi-channel heatmap, one channel per re-
sampling characteristic, at every point at which the patches
were extracted. By densely extracting overlapping patches
(stride of 8), we can interpret a correspondence between a
pixel from the original image and the point in the heatmap
representing the patch centered at that pixel. As final steps,
we postprocess this heatmap and use it to produce an image-
level detection score and binarized localization map. The
manipulated regions are then extracted using image seg-
mentation methods based on Otsu’s thresholding and Ran-
dom Walk segmentation.
There is a tradeoff in selecting the patch size: resam-
pling is more detectable in larger patch sizes because the
resampling signal has more repetitions, but small manip-
ulated regions will not be localized that well. We choose
64x64 as a small size that we can detect reasonably well, as
will be discussed in section 3.1. We extract patches with a
stride of 8 for computational efficiency and to have a con-
sistent response w.r.t. 8x8 JPEG blocks. The features in
the first step start with the absolute value of a 3x3 Lapla-
cian filter, which produces an image of the magnitude of
linear predictive error. To look for periodic correlations in
the linear predictor error, we apply the Radon transform to
accumulate errors along various angles of projection, and
then take the FFT to find the periodicity. This was proposed
in [28]. We performed some additional experiments on this
feature extraction stage to try to explore any potential vari-
ations that could improve these features. One improvement
we found was to take the square root of the magnitude af-
ter Laplacian filtering. We also compared with using the
residual from a 3x3 Median filter and found that the 3x3
Laplacian produces 4.6% better results (mean AUC over 6
binary classification tasks).
The second step is to characterize any resampling de-
tected in the patch. We train a set of six binary classifiers
that check for different types of resampling. The six resam-
pling characteristics are: JPEG quality thresholded above
or below 85, upsampling, downsampling, rotation clock-
wise, rotation counterclockwise, and shearing (in an affine
transformation matrix). To train a model for each task, we
build a dataset of about 100,000 patches extracted from
about 8,000 images from two publicly available datasets
of raw uncompressed images, UCID [39] and RAISE [12]
datasets. Some of the patches are transformed with a set of
randomly generated parameters, like multiple JPEG com-
pressions and affine transformations, but one half of the
dataset must include the transformation specified, and the
other half must not. The classifiers are not mutually exclu-
sive, and are trained individually. The best performing clas-
sifier we found for this task was an artificial neural network
with two hidden layers. Using cross-validation this beat a
Bayesian quadratic classifier by 6.5% on mean AUC (0.82
vs 0.77 mean AUC averaged over the six classifiers). The
filtering in the third step uses bilateral filtering, which has
been shown to improve region detection accuracy in other
domains like semantic segmentation when fusing adjacent
noisy local patch-based classifiers [20]. The fourth and fi-
nal step is to obtain a mask showing manipulated regions
from the filtered resampling heatmaps using proposed se-
lective segmentation model.
3.1. Deep Neural Networks for Resampling Detec-
tion
As described in the previous section, we found that an
artificial neural network with two hidden layers performed
best as a binary classifier characterizing resampling in a
patch for step 2 in our detection pipeline. We also explored
using a newly proposed convolutional layer [6] as the first
layer of an end-to-end patch classification network to learn
to extract resampling features itself, rather than using our
hand-crafted resampling features described before as step 1
of our pipeline. These two neural network architectures are
graphed visually in Fig. 3.
Figure 3: Deep Neural networks for detecting resampling in
small patches.
We experimented with using an FFT within the network
of model II, made possible by Tensorflow [2], and inspired
by model I. Compared to a model that did not include the
FFT, we found that the inclusion of the FFT stabilized train-
ing, reducing noise in the training loss, and caused the
model to converge faster and to a slightly higher (1%) fi-
nal score.
We found that the first architecture (I) using hand-
crafted features performed slightly better at detecting rota-
tion, shearing, and downsampling, but the second architec-
ture (II) performed significantly better at detecting upsam-
pling and differences in JPEG compression quality factors.
The best ROC AUC scores of the methods are listed in the
table below, and the model from which the best score was
taken is listed in the rightmost column. Model II performed
1% to 3% worse on the four lower rows, which was a small
but consistent difference that could be due to optimization
difficulties. Model I’s best ROC AUC scores for the first
two rows, JPG quality and rescaling up, were 0.87 and 0.89
respectively.
The scores on patch resampling classification depend on
the patch size, particularly the JPEG quality level detection
and scaling up. We compared against another state-of-the-
art deep learning model [7], which was trained on larger
Figure 4: (a)-(f) Outputs from the neural network
based resampling detector of a manipulated image
Figure 5: (a)-(f) Corresponding histograms of images
in Fig. 4
AUC Model
JPG quality 0.93 II.
Rescale up 0.92 II.
Rescale down 0.77 I.
Rotate CW 0.81 I.
Rotate CCW 0.81 I.
Shearing 0.76 I.
Table 1: Experiments on patch classification
256x256 patch sizes. The evaluation metric they use is ac-
curacy, while we use AUC which is a more robust evalu-
ation metric. Averaged over JPEG quality factors from 60
to 100, the authors report 96.8% accuracy for detecting up-
scaling. In our experiments, we report the trend in AUC
of 0.922 on 64x64 patches and AUC 0.950 on 128x128
patches. Following the trend in increasing accuracy with
increasing patch size, we are at a similar level of accuracy.
In addition, a fair and direct comparison would require tun-
ing each method to use the best patch size and on the same
dataset.
3.2. Mask Filtering and Segmentation
Here we describe how we filter the heatmaps and seg-
ment the manipulated regions.
The noisy feature maps (Fig. 4) can be filtered to enhance
segmentation. As shown in the Fig. 5, the gray level his-
tograms of these maps have nice properties with respect to
their distribution (unimodal). This distribution can be com-
pared to that of a special case of adding excessive gaussian-
like noise to the binary images. As seen in Fig. 6, the third
image from the left that was obtained after adding exces-
sive white gaussian noise and has a similar histogram dis-
tribution to that of our feature maps. The goal is to obtain
a bimodal-like distribution for the histogram of the feature
maps after filtering (similar to that of the second image in
Fig. 6) that will be useful for the segmentation task.
We used edge-preserving bilateral filters as inspired by
their successful application in the semantic segmentation
field [20, 43], a mathematically analogous task of filtering
a set of noisy classifier outputs predicted on overlapping
patches. The bilateral filter parameters were empirically
determined from the noise distribution of various feature
maps. As shown in the Fig. 8, only a subset of these six
feature maps have a bimodal-like distribution in their his-
tograms after filtering. Therefore, the ones which does not
Figure 6: (a) Noiseless 8-bit image. (b) Image with additive
Gaussian noise of mean 0 and variance 0.0001. (c) Image
with additive Gaussian noise of mean 0 and variance 0.06.
(d)-(f) Corresponding histograms
have such a distribution are not used for segmentation.
The feature maps that are used for the segmentation
is determined by Otsu method of thresholding image his-
tograms [32] where it can detect bimodal distributions
based on the fact that this threshold minimizes the intra-
class variance and maximizes the inter-class variances of
two predicted classes. As seen in the Fig. 8, the Otsu thresh-
old is either a value close to the mean of the distribution or
it separates the two classes of a bimodal distribution.
A random-walker segmentation [40] is then applied to
each of these maps to diffuse the corresponding pixels in be-
tween the two modes to either of the classes (class-1 being
the pixel values less than the first mode and class-2 being
the pixel values greater than the second mode). This proba-
bilistic based method is useful as it locates the weak/missing
boundaries and is even robust in noisier conditions. Finally,
a bitwise-OR operation is used to add all these binary im-
ages to obtain a final mask image.
3.2.1 Localization based confidence score metric
Bilateral filtering is implemented using ArrayFire package
in Python which uses GPU’s for faster computations by
making some approximations. Therefore, a gray-scale mask
is generated instead of a binary mask (by considering the
mean of all the binary masks for many iterations). The con-
fidence score is generated by adding the normalized non-
zero pixel values (normalized pixel value of 1 corresponds
to a black or manipulated region) and averaging them over
the number of non-zero pixels in the gray-scale mask image.
3.3. Patch Classification Framework
Now-a-days authentication of image tampering is a very
difficult problem due to the close resemblance between the
manipulated and genuine images. However, most of the
image manipulations have a common characteristic, which
shows discriminative features in the boundary shared be-
tween manipulated and non-manipulated regions. In this
paper, we present a network which exploits resampling fea-
tures along with long-short term memory (LSTM) cells in
order to localize the manipulated regions.
3.3.1 Resampling Features
In [33], the authors proposed the seminal method to detect
resampling in digital images. We will provide a brief intro-
duction to their approach. The idea is that resampling in-
troduces periodic correlations among pixels due to interpo-
lation. To detect these correlations, they use a linear model
in which each pixel is assumed to belong to two classes: a
resampled class and a non resampled class , each with equal
probability. The conditional probability for a pixel belong-
ing to the resampled class is assumed to be Gaussian while
the conditional probability for a pixel belonging to the other
class is assumed to be uniform. To simultaneously estimate
a pixel’s probability of being a linear combination with its
neighboring pixels and the unknown weights of the com-
bination, an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is
used. In the Expectation Step, the probability of a pixel be-
longing to the resampled class is calculated. This is used
in the Maximization step to estimate the weights. The stop-
ping condition is enforced when the difference in weights
between two consecutive iterations is very small. At this
stage, the matrix (same dimensions as image) of probabil-
ity values obtained in the Expectation step for every pixel
of the image is called the “Probability map (p-map)”. For a
resampled image this p-map is periodic and peaks in the 2D
Fourier spectrum of the p-map indicate resampling. In the
p-map, a probability value close to 1 indicates that a pixel
is resampled. However, the EM algorithm based p-map is
computationally expensive. In this paper, we use a simpler
method to compute the p-map that first filters the image us-
ing a linear filter and then computes the residual image on
which the p-map was calculated [19].
3.3.2 Long-Short Term Memory (LSTM) Network
Manipulation distorts the natural statistics of an image, es-
pecially in the boundary region. In this paper, we utilize the
LSTM network to learn the correlation between blocks of
resampling features as shown in Fig. 9. In order to utilize
LSTM, we first divide the 2D resampling feature map into
blocks. We split into 8×8 blocks, where each block has size
8×8 (total 64 pixels). Now, we learn the long distance block
dependency feeding each block to each cell of the LSTM in
a sequential manner. The LSTM cells correlate neighbor-
ing blocks with current block. In this work, we utilize 3
stacked layers, and at each layer, 64 cells are used. In the
last layer, each cell provides 256-d feature vector which is
fed into softmax classifier. The key insight of using LSTM
is to learn the boundary transformation between different
blocks, which provides discriminative features between ma-
nipulated and non-manipulated patch. In the following, we
will briefly discuss about the parameters of a LSTM cell.
The cell is an important entity to build an LSTM net-
work. The information flow in the cells is controlled by
gates. There are mainly three gates that link a cell to neigh-
boring cell, and they are (1) input gate, (2) forget gate, and
(3) output gate. Let us denote cell state and output state as
Ct and zt for current cell t. Cell state and output states are
controlled by these gates. Each gate has a value ranging
from zero to one, activated by a sigmoid function. These
gates actually make decisions about how much information
should be passed through. Higher value implies the flow of
more information. Each cell produces new candidate cell
state C¯t. Using the previous cell state Ct−1 and C¯t, we can
Figure 7: (a)-(f) Bilateral filtered heatmaps
Figure 8: (a)-(f) Corresponding histograms of images in
Fig. 7 with Otsu thresholds marked with “N”
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Figure 9: LSTM Framework for Patch Classification.
write the updated cell state Ct as
Ct = ft ◦ Ct−1 + it ◦ C¯t (1)
Here, ◦ denotes the pointwise multiplication. Finally, we
obtain the output of the current cell ht, which can be repre-
sented as
ht = ot ◦ tanh(Ct) (2)
In Eqns. 1 and 2, i, f, o represent input, forget and output
gates.
3.3.3 Soft-max Layer
In the proposed network, we have a softmax layer for patch
classification task. For this task, the labels are predicted
at the final layer of LSTM network. Given a patch of an
image, we obtain the features which are used to predict the
manipulated class (either patch label or pixel class) using
softmax function. Let W be the parameter associated with
feature. Then, F , the softmax function can be written as
P (Yk) = exp
(W)TF∑Nc
k=1 exp
(Wk)TF (3)
Here, Nc is the number of classes (∈ R2×1) - manipulated
vs non-manipulated. WkL implies the weight vector associ-
ated to the class k. Using Eqn. 3, we compute the proba-
bility distribution over various classes. Now, we can predict
labels by maximizing P (Yk) with respect to k. The pre-
dicted label can be obtained by Yˆ = arg max
k
P (Yk).
3.3.4 Training the Network
In this paper, we perform patch classification whether it is
manipulated or not. We compute the cross entropy loss of
this task given ground-truth patch labels.
Patch Classification. Patch labels are predicted at the end
of the LSTM network as shown in Fig. 9. Let us denote
θp = [θ1,W], which is a weight vector associated with
patch classifiation. Here, θ1 contains the parameters of first
two convlution layers and LSTM layers. W is the param-
eter at the softmax layer of patch classification. Now, we
can compute the cross entropy loss for patch classification
as follows.
Lp(θp) = − 1
Mp
Mp∑
j=1
Np∑
k=1
1(Yj = k) log(Yj = k|xj ; θp)
(4)
Here, 1(.) is the indicator function, which equals to 1 if
j = k, otherwise it equals 0. Yj and xj imply the patch
label (manipulated or non-manipulated) and the feature of
the sample j. Mp is the number of patches.
Figure 10: (a) Manipulated Image (b) Ground truth (c) Resampling detector output visualizing 3 out of 6 classifiers. Each
color represents a different type of manipulation. (d) Predicted mask
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Results on Radon transformed and Deep
Learning based detection and localization
In this section, we demonstrate our experimental re-
sults for two tasks-(1) identification of tampered patch,
and (2) segmentation of manipulated regions given a patch.
We evaluate the proposed model on NIST Nimble 2016
dataset [1] for the Media Forensics challenge. This dataset
includes mainly three types of manipulation: (a) copy-
clone, (b) removal, and (c) splicing. The images are tam-
pered in a sophisticated way to beat current state-of-the-art
detection techniques. The results in Fig. 10 show the effi-
cacy of the proposed model for different images in Nimble
2016 dataset.
4.2. Results on LSTM based patch classifier
Here we again use the Nimble 2016 dataset [1] to test the
efficacy of LSTM based approach. We use ROC curves to
evaluate our method. The curve is created by plotting the
true positive rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR)
at various threshold. Fig. 11 shows ROC curve of the pro-
posed method for patch classification. We also compare our
methods on raw pixels of a patch. From the Fig. 11, we can
see that utilization of resampling features boosts the perfor-
mance in patch classification. We also show our classifica-
tion result in Table 2. The results in Table 2 and Fig. 11
attest that the method is effective in classifying tampered
patches.
Method Classification AUC
Proposed Method 94.86% 0.9138
Table 2: Results of patch classification for LSTM based ap-
proach
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
 
 
Proposed Method,AUC-0.91
AUC-0.5
LSTM+Raw Pixel, AUC-0.83
Figure 11: ROC Curve comparing LSTM based method on
Pixels and Resampling Detection features
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two methods to detect and
localize manipulated regions in images. Our experiments
showed that both Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs)
and LSTM based networks are effective in exploiting re-
sampling features to detect tampered regions. In future, we
will look into ways of combining these methods and detect
image forgeries.
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